Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Counterparts and Identity' and 'Metaphysical Dependence'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
14092 Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
14100 Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
18823 To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
14096 Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
14097 Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
14095 Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14093 An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14094 The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14101 Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16409 Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
16411 If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
16412 If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16410 Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
14099 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5996 Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
14098 An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen]