38 ideas
| 19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
| 19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
| 19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
| 19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
| 19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
| 19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
| 19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
| 19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
| 19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
| 19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
| 19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
| 19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
| 19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
| 19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
| 19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
| 19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
| 19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
| 19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
| 19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
| 19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
| 4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
| 4880 | Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett] |
| 4873 | What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett] |
| 19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
| 4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
| 4875 | We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett] |
| 4879 | There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett] |
| 4876 | Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett] |
| 4878 | The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett] |
| 4874 | The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett] |
| 4882 | Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett] |
| 5996 | Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA] |
| 4872 | Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett] |
| 19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
| 19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
| 4877 | Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett] |
| 19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
| 19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |