Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Infinitism solution to regress problem' and 'To be is to be the value of a variable..'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence

8833	Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P]

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing

7785	The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory

10699

Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic

10225

Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]

10736

Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]

10780

Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic

10697

Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification

13671

Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification

10267

We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]

10698

Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification

7806	Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers

10700

First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

8834	Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P]

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations

8838	If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P]

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

8839	Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia

5996	Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]