16 ideas
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
5996 | Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA] |
16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |
16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |