13 ideas
5637 | Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton] |
7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton] |
10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
5996 | Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA] |
5660 | Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton] |
5653 | A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton] |