39 ideas
| 21704 | 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B] |
| 21705 | Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B] |
| 10373 | Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J] |
| 21727 | Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B] |
| 21719 | Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B] |
| 21723 | The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B] |
| 21721 | Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B] |
| 21703 | Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B] |
| 21714 | The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B] |
| 21713 | Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B] |
| 21715 | For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B] |
| 10367 | There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J] |
| 21729 | Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B] |
| 5996 | Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA] |
| 10359 | In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J] |
| 10372 | Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J] |
| 10374 | There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J] |
| 10366 | Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J] |
| 10377 | Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J] |
| 10378 | A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J] |
| 10382 | Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10375 | At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J] |
| 10389 | Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J] |
| 10390 | Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J] |
| 10380 | Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J] |
| 10385 | If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10388 | Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J] |
| 10387 | The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J] |
| 10384 | If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10386 | If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J] |
| 10361 | Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J] |
| 10360 | Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J] |
| 10362 | One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J] |
| 10368 | If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J] |
| 10383 | The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J] |
| 10393 | Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J] |
| 10394 | Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J] |
| 10376 | The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J] |
| 10381 | All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J] |