Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues' and 'Thought and Talk'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thought depends on speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]