Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Davidson on himself' and 'Naturalizing the Mind'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]