15 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |
5996 | Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA] |