Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Necessary Beings' and 'Against Structural Universals'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

41 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
19275 You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
19291 A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
19297 The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale]
19301 With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
19296 If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
19289 Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
19298 Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
19295 Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
19281 Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
19278 There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
15436 Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
19302 If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
19290 Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
19286 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
19288 Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
19285 Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale]
19287 Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
19282 It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
19276 The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
19293 Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
19294 If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
19279 What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
19299 Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
15450 Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
19300 The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
15443 Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5996 Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]