Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Scientific Image' and 'Principia Ethica'

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20 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
14919 Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6783 To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
14917 To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
6784 Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
13066 An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5996 Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]