Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Contingent Identity' and 'reports of last days'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
343 The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
344 If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates]
339 Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5996 Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
2 We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
345 A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
346 One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
341 Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
347 Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
338 Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato]