45 ideas
19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
22270 | Frege changed philosophy by extending logic's ability to check the grounds of thinking [Potter on Frege] |
8939 | We should not describe human laws of thought, but how to correctly track truth [Frege, by Fisher] |
19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
4971 | I don't use 'subject' and 'predicate' in my way of representing a judgement [Frege] |
17745 | For Frege, 'All A's are B's' means that the concept A implies the concept B [Frege, by Walicki] |
7728 | Frege has a judgement stroke (vertical, asserting or judging) and a content stroke (horizontal, expressing) [Frege, by Weiner] |
16881 | The laws of logic are boundless, so we want the few whose power contains the others [Frege] |
7622 | In 1879 Frege developed second order logic [Frege, by Putnam] |
19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
7729 | Frege replaced Aristotle's subject/predicate form with function/argument form [Frege, by Weiner] |
9950 | A quantifier is a second-level predicate (which explains how it contributes to truth-conditions) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9991 | For Frege the variable ranges over all objects [Frege, by Tait] |
10536 | Frege's domain for variables is all objects, but modern interpretations first fix the domain [Dummett on Frege] |
7730 | Frege introduced quantifiers for generality [Frege, by Weiner] |
7742 | Frege reduced most quantifiers to 'everything' combined with 'not' [Frege, by McCullogh] |
13824 | Proof theory began with Frege's definition of derivability [Frege, by Prawitz] |
13609 | Frege produced axioms for logic, though that does not now seem the natural basis for logic [Frege, by Kaplan] |
19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
17855 | It may be possible to define induction in terms of the ancestral relation [Frege, by Wright,C] |
10607 | Frege's logic has a hierarchy of object, property, property-of-property etc. [Frege, by Smith,P] |
11008 | Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read] |
22280 | Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter] |
5996 | Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA] |
7741 | The predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier [Frege, by Weiner] |