19 ideas
10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
15200 | How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
14761 | Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart] |
10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |
5996 | Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA] |
2608 | For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer] |
22936 | A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
4231 | Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
8591 | There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart] |
22935 | The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
7802 | A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle] |
4230 | A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
15199 | The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |