Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Gravity and Grace (9 extracts)' and 'Value Theory'

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27 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We seek truth only because it is good [Weil]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
There are two goods - the absolute good we want, and the reachable opposite of evil [Weil]
The good is a nothingness, and yet real [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Our only social duty is to try to limit evil [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The collective is the one and only object of false idolatry [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
Charity is the only love, and you can feel that for a country (a place with traditions), but not a nation [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If effort is from necessity rather than for a good, it is slavery [Weil]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is the intrinsic value of a human [Weil]