74 ideas
1627 | Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine] |
1623 | Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine] |
14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |
17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
17738 | Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine] |
17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
1628 | If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine] |
17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
10929 | Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine] |
17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
12188 | Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge] |
15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
9383 | Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine] |
12424 | Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher] |
9338 | Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine] |
9337 | Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich] |
9340 | Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine] |
1620 | Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine] |
1629 | Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine] |
19488 | The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo] |
1625 | Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine] |
1626 | It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine] |
7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
1621 | Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine] |
9371 | Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine] |
1622 | Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine] |
9366 | Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian] |
14473 | Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson] |
7321 | The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine] |
8803 | Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine] |
17737 | The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins] |
1624 | If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine] |
541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |
542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |