16 ideas
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |