28 ideas
| 579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
| 13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
| 578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
| 22191 | Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham] |
| 18076 | Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher] |
| 13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
| 22183 | Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn] |
| 6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn] |
| 22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha] |
| 7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn] |
| 13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
| 13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
| 13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
| 13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
| 13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
| 13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
| 13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
| 13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
| 13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
| 13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
| 13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
| 13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
| 13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
| 13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
| 13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
| 13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |