Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness'' and 'The Central Questions of Philosophy'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
5331 You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
2611 It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
16520 We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
579 Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
578 Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
2613 The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
5328 Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
5330 Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
9312 Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
9315 Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
9313 Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
9316 How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
9314 Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
5325 Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
5326 Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5324 Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
5322 Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
5327 Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5329 Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
2610 Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]