11 ideas
| 17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
| 17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
| 579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |