21 ideas
11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
19718 | Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann] |
19717 | Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann] |
19716 | Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann] |
19715 | You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann] |
19714 | Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann] |
19713 | Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann] |
19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |
578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |