29 ideas
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
19115 | You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
19119 | We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli] |
19111 | Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli] |
19114 | Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli] |
19113 | Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli] |
19116 | Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli] |
19117 | We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli] |
19118 | People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli] |
19110 | In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli] |
19112 | Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli] |
579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |