Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Human Personality' and 'Concepts'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Genius and love of truth are always accompanied by great humility [Weil]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
What is sacred is not a person, but the whole physical human being [Weil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The mind is imprisoned and limited by language, restricting our awareness of wider thoughts [Weil]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence]
Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence]
The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence]
Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence]
It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence]
Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence]
Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence]
Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence]
The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence]
The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
Beauty is an attractive mystery, leaving nothing to be desired [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
All we need are the unity of justice, truth and beauty [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
The sacred in every human is their expectation of good rather than evil [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Everything which originates in love is beautiful [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil is transmitted by comforts and pleasures, but mostly by doing harm to people [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
It is not more money which the wretched members of society need [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The problem of the collective is not suppression of persons, but persons erasing themselves [Weil]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
People absurdly claim an equal share of things which are essentially privileged [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights are asserted contentiously, and need the backing of force [Weil]
Giving centrality to rights stifles all impulses of charity [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The spirit of justice needs the full attention of truth, and that attention is love [Weil]
Justice (concerning harm) is distinct from rights (concerning inequality) [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Punishment aims at the good for men who don't desire it [Weil]
The only thing in society worse than crime is repressive justice [Weil]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
The only choice is between supernatural good, or evil [Weil]