Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On the Source of Necessity' and 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
15102 S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
579 Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
15103 Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
578 Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264 Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
9266 A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267 Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20015 Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
15104 The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron]