Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey' and 'Phaedrus'

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55 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 4. Open Question
We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
I revere anyone who can discern a single thing that encompasses many things [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton]
If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
True knowledge is of the reality behind sense experience [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
If the apparent facts strongly conflict with probability, it is in everyone's interests to suppress the facts [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The soul is self-motion [Plato]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato saw emotions and appetites as wild horses, in need of taming [Plato, by Goldie]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
An excellent speech seems to imply a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker [Plato]
Only a good philosopher can be a good speaker [Plato]
'Phaedrus' pioneers the notion of philosophical rhetoric [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is the clearest and most lovely of the Forms [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The two ruling human principles are the natural desire for pleasure, and an acquired love of virtue [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Most pleasure is release from pain, and is therefore not worthwhile [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Reason impels us towards excellence, which teaches us self-control [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Bad people are never really friends with one another [Plato]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The mind of God is fully satisfied and happy with a vision of reality and truth [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
We cannot conceive of God, so we have to think of Him as an immortal version of ourselves [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
There isn't a single reason for positing the existence of immortal beings [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Soul is always in motion, so it must be self-moving and immortal [Plato]