26 ideas
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |