Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Modal Logic' and 'The Fixation of Belief'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]