18 ideas
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |