30 ideas
| 8092 | Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin] |
| 2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
| 2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
| 4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
| 2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
| 8081 | 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin] |
| 8085 | Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin] |
| 8086 | Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin] |
| 8091 | Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin] |
| 8089 | Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin] |
| 8087 | Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin] |
| 8082 | Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin] |
| 8072 | Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin] |
| 8075 | Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin] |
| 579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
| 6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
| 578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
| 8088 | People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin] |
| 2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
| 2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
| 2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
| 2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
| 2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
| 2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
| 8073 | How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin] |
| 2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
| 8076 | The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin] |
| 2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |