58 ideas
16227 | Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley] |
21122 | Liberal Nationalism says welfare states and democracy needed a shared sense of nationality [Shorten] |
16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
16211 | A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley] |
16219 | Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley] |
16223 | Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley] |
16226 | Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley] |
16208 | Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley] |
16221 | Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley] |
16230 | Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley] |
16232 | An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley] |
16200 | Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley] |
16237 | The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley] |
16238 | Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley] |
16220 | Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley] |
16222 | Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley] |
16228 | The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley] |
16229 | Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley] |
14492 | If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley] |
16193 | 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley] |
16195 | Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley] |
16202 | The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley] |
16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
16197 | How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley] |
16191 | Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley] |
16199 | If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley] |
16201 | Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley] |
16240 | If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley] |
16203 | Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley] |
16204 | Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley] |
16212 | An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley] |
16213 | Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley] |
16206 | Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley] |
16205 | The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley] |
579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
16225 | If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley] |
16239 | To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley] |
578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
16218 | On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley] |
21136 | Utilitarians conflate acts and omissions; causing to drown and failing to save are the same [Shorten] |
21135 | There are eight different ways in which groups of people can be oppressed [Shorten, by PG] |
21118 | Constitutional Patriotism unites around political values (rather than national identity) [Shorten] |
21129 | Democracy is a method of selection, or it involves participation, or it concerns public discussion [Shorten] |
21130 | Some say democracy is intrinsically valuable, others that it delivers good outcomes [Shorten] |
21126 | Representative should be either obedient, or sensible, or typical [Shorten] |
21128 | There is 'mirror representation' when the institution statistically reflects the population [Shorten] |
21127 | In a changed situation a Mandated Representative can't keep promises and fight for constituents [Shorten] |
21117 | Liberal citizens have a moral requirement to respect freedom and equality [Shorten] |
21134 | Maybe the rational autonomous liberal individual is merely the result of domination [Shorten] |
21113 | Liberal equality concerns rights, and liberal freedom concerns choice of ends [Shorten] |
21121 | Liberal Nationalism encourages the promotion of nationalistic values [Shorten] |
21115 | Liberalism should not make assumptions such as the value of choosing your own life plan [Shorten] |
21114 | Liberals treat individuals as mutual strangers, rather than as social beings [Shorten] |
21123 | Liberal Nationalism is more communitarian, and Constitutional Patriotism more cosmopolitan [Shorten] |
21124 | Religious toleration has been institutionalised by the separation of church and state [Shorten] |
16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
16207 | Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley] |