18 ideas
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
13804 | A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G] |
13805 | Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G] |
13808 | A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G] |
13806 | Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G] |
13807 | A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G] |
13809 | One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G] |
579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |