Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Limits of Contingency' and 'Equality and Partiality'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]