Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Propositions' and 'Plural Quantification Exposed'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo]
Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]