20 ideas
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |