119 ideas
| 11283 | There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 1672 | Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle] |
| 1684 | Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle] |
| 12145 | Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle] |
| 12384 | Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle] |
| 12075 | An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 9066 | You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle] |
| 12382 | What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle] |
| 1668 | An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle] |
| 12376 | Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle] |
| 12373 | Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle] |
| 12363 | Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle] |
| 6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
| 13004 | Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
| 12377 | Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle] |
| 12372 | The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle] |
| 12369 | A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle] |
| 18910 | To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle] |
| 1675 | Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle] |
| 1677 | We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle] |
| 1687 | Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle] |
| 1681 | Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle] |
| 12146 | Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle] |
| 17039 | The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle] |
| 11994 | Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung] |
| 6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
| 579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 12381 | What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle] |
| 1690 | A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle] |
| 12072 | For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12073 | 'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt] |
| 12378 | The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle] |
| 12364 | We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle] |
| 12370 | Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle] |
| 12366 | We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle] |
| 1685 | No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle] |
| 6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
| 1673 | Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle] |
| 6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
| 6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
| 12379 | You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle] |
| 16725 | Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle] |
| 6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
| 6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
| 6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
| 6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
| 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
| 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
| 6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
| 1693 | Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle] |
| 23309 | Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 9067 | Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle] |
| 6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
| 1671 | Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle] |
| 1670 | When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle] |
| 578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
| 12147 | The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle] |
| 12383 | There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle] |
| 24068 | Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 17310 | Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
| 21359 | Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle] |
| 12365 | We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle] |
| 1667 | Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle] |
| 10918 | Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle] |
| 12374 | Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle] |
| 12148 | Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle] |
| 1680 | Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle] |
| 1674 | All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle] |
| 1679 | Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle] |
| 1691 | Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle] |
| 12371 | A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle] |
| 1683 | We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle] |
| 12380 | Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle] |
| 12385 | Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle] |
| 12367 | What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle] |
| 1689 | Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle] |
| 1686 | What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle] |
| 12357 | Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 1669 | The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle] |
| 1678 | Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle] |
| 6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
| 6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
| 6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
| 6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
| 9068 | Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle] |
| 9069 | A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle] |
| 6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
| 6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
| 6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
| 6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
| 6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
| 6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
| 6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
| 6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
| 6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
| 6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
| 6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
| 6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
| 6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
| 6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
| 6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
| 6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
| 6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
| 6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
| 9070 | We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle] |
| 6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
| 6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
| 12368 | Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle] |
| 1692 | If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle] |
| 6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
| 6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
| 6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
| 6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
| 12375 | Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle] |
| 1688 | Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle] |