12 ideas
| 579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 3157 | T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey] |
| 3154 | Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |