12 ideas
| 15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
| 10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
| 4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham] |
| 579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
| 10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 4303 | The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham] |
| 578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 4306 | For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham] |