41 ideas
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
| 17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
| 17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
| 17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |
| 17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
| 579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
| 17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
| 17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |
| 4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
| 4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
| 4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |
| 4351 | It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse] |
| 4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
| 4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
| 4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
| 4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
| 4358 | Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
| 4337 | Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse] |
| 4324 | Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
| 4359 | When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse] |
| 4336 | Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse] |
| 4334 | Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse] |
| 4361 | Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse] |
| 4349 | Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse] |
| 4352 | Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse] |
| 4353 | If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse] |
| 4346 | The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse] |
| 4339 | According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse] |
| 4354 | Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse] |
| 4364 | Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse] |
| 4356 | We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse] |
| 4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
| 4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
| 4328 | Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse] |
| 4343 | We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse] |
| 4338 | Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse] |
| 4365 | We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse] |
| 4350 | If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse] |