Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Putnam's Paradox' and 'Semantic Necessity'

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13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]