13 ideas
14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |