Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz' and 'The Limits of Reason'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18696 The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
18701 The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18694 Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
18692 Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
18693 Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button]
18695 An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
579 Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
578 Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
18700 Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
18698 Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18697 A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button]