Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Meditations' and 'Things qua Truthmakers'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


176 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes]
It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes]
Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes]
Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes]
I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes]
Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes]
Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes]
Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
"I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes]
I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes]
"I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes]
The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes]
Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes]
The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes]
'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes]
A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes]
The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes]
That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes]
Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes]
The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes]
How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes]
My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes]
We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes]
The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes]
Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe]
Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes]
It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes]
Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes]
Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes]
We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes]
The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes]
Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes]
Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes]
The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes]
It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes]
If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes]
To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes]
I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes]
For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes]
Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes]
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim]
The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes]
Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes]
Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes]
Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes]
Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes]
Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes]
The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes]
I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long]
Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes]
Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes]
One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes]
The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes]
I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes]
We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes]
We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes]
Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / c. Human Error
God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes]
Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes]
Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus]
If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes]