99 ideas
| 9199 | Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus] |
| 22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
| 20853 | Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20772 | Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus] |
| 12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
| 5969 | Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 21388 | The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| 20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20793 | How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus] |
| 8077 | Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
| 12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
| 20791 | Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 8078 | Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin] |
| 6023 | Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| 12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
| 5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
| 21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| 12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
| 16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
| 12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
| 16058 | Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria] |
| 12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
| 11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
| 12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
| 12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
| 12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
| 12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
| 12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
| 16059 | Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley] |
| 12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
| 11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
| 12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
| 12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
| 12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
| 12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
| 12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
| 12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
| 12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
| 12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
| 12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
| 1875 | Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 20834 | Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
| 20833 | A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 20808 | Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20835 | Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus] |
| 20836 | The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| 20837 | Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus] |
| 21679 | When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus] |
| 5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
| 20850 | Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
| 20869 | The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus] |
| 3044 | Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20838 | Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus] |
| 23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
| 20813 | Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus] |
| 23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
| 3045 | Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20774 | Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus] |
| 22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
| 22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
| 22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
| 20864 | Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus] |
| 5972 | Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 1777 | Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5973 | Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
| 22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
| 20845 | There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
| 5967 | People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
| 5966 | All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus] |
| 20855 | Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5970 | Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
| 22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
| 20842 | Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20856 | Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1779 | We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20857 | Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20812 | Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus] |
| 21403 | The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long] |
| 20828 | Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
| 5975 | Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 20819 | The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 20818 | The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 20821 | Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus] |
| 3048 | Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20773 | The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus] |
| 3042 | Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 5965 | The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus] |
| 1782 | Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20830 | Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus] |
| 21404 | There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus] |