Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' and 'Fear and Trembling'

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132 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant]
The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard]
Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant]
Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant]
The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus]
Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant]
Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant]
If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman]
The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant]
We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant]
It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant]
The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant]
Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant]
There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant]
Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels]
Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant]
Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant]
Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham]
Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson]
Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant]
Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant]
The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant]
If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant]
Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant]
Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant]
The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant]
I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant]
Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG]
Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant]
Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie]
Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant]
Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse]
Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant]
If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant]
If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant]
Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant]
Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant]
The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long]
Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus]
Either Abraham rises higher than universal ethics, or he is a mere murderer [Kierkegaard]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant]
We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus]
Abraham was willing to suspend ethics, for a higher idea [Kierkegaard]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus]