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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue' and 'Topics'

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123 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus]
Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing [Aristotle]
Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus [Aristotle]
We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae [Aristotle]
The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence [Aristotle]
The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence [Aristotle]
Differentia are generic, and belong with genus [Aristotle]
'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Unit is the starting point of number [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle]
Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future) [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Everything that is has one single essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Destruction is dissolution of essence [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents [Aristotle]
Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different [Aristotle]
Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is the progress from particulars to universals [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus]
A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant]
Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant]
The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant]
If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful [Aristotle]
Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant]
Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant]
Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant]
Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant]
Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant]
We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
We value friendship just for its own sake [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is intrinsically a civilized animal [Aristotle]
Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant]
Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant]
Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long]
Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
All water is the same, because of a certain similarity [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists [Aristotle]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus]