Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things' and 'Spreading the Word'

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101 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom for one instant is as good as wisdom for eternity [Chrysippus]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise men should try to participate in politics, since they are a good influence [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Three branches of philosophy: first logic, second ethics, third physics (which ends with theology) [Chrysippus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
The causes of future true events must exist now, so they will happen because of destiny [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Stoic propositional logic is like chemistry - how atoms make molecules, not the innards of atoms [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Chrysippus has five obvious 'indemonstrables' of reasoning [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
Modus ponens is one of five inference rules identified by the Stoics [Chrysippus, by Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Every proposition is either true or false [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce]
There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Dion and Theon coexist, but Theon lacks a foot. If Dion loses a foot, he ousts Theon? [Chrysippus, by Philo of Alexandria]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change of matter doesn't destroy identity - in Dion and Theon change is a condition of identity [Chrysippus, by Long/Sedley]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs show reason in decisions made by elimination [Chrysippus, by Sext.Empiricus]
We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce]
Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Everything is fated, either by continuous causes or by a supreme rational principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus is wrong to believe in non-occurring future possibilities if he is a fatalist [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
Fate is an eternal and fixed chain of causal events [Chrysippus]
When we say events are fated by antecedent causes, do we mean principal or auxiliary causes? [Chrysippus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
The highest degree of morality performs all that is appropriate, omitting nothing [Chrysippus]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Stoics say that beauty and goodness are equivalent and linked [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
People need nothing except corn and water [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All virtue is good, but not always praised (as in not lusting after someone ugly) [Chrysippus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Chrysippus says virtue can be lost (though Cleanthes says it is too secure for that) [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Chrysippus says nothing is blameworthy, as everything conforms with the best nature [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Rational animals begin uncorrupted, but externals and companions are bad influences [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Justice, the law, and right reason are natural and not conventional [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
We don't have obligations to animals as they aren't like us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice is irrelevant to animals, because they are too unlike us [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Covers are for shields, and sheaths for swords; likewise, all in the cosmos is for some other thing [Chrysippus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The later Stoics identified the logos with an air-fire compound, called 'pneuma' [Chrysippus, by Long]
Fire is a separate element, not formed with others (as was previously believed) [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
Stoics say earth, air, fire and water are the primary elements [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
The past and the future subsist, but only the present exists [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present does not exist, so our immediate experience is actually part past and part future [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
Time is continous and infinitely divisible, so there cannot be a wholly present time [Chrysippus, by Stobaeus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Stoics say that God the creator is the perfection of all animals [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
The origin of justice can only be in Zeus, and in nature [Chrysippus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Stoics teach that law is identical with right reason, which is the will of Zeus [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
The source of all justice is Zeus and the universal nature [Chrysippus]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Stoics teach that God is a unity, variously known as Mind, or Fate, or Jupiter [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Death can't separate soul from body, because incorporeal soul can't unite with body [Chrysippus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
There is a rationale in terrible disasters; they are useful to the whole, and make good possible [Chrysippus]