Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Making Things Happen' and 'Intro: Theories of Vagueness'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades]
We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
An explanation is a causal graph [Woodward,J, by Strevens]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius]