61 ideas
2666 | Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero] |
23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
21390 | Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades] |
21672 | We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero] |
5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
15825 | Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm] |
21389 | Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades] |
22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
21671 | Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero] |
22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
21391 | Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero] |
21674 | Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero] |
22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
7398 | Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck] |
5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
21392 | People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius] |
5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |