Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Epistemology', 'Introspection' and 'There is no question of physicalism'

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13 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
7855 Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
7301 The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7302 Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7303 If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
7299 Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7300 An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
5691 The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
7297 My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
6120 Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5687 For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
5688 Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
6121 There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
6122 No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]