Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Epistemology', 'Truth (2nd edn)' and 'What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?'

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24 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
6334 The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
6342 Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
6332 The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
6335 The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
6344 Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
6336 No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
23299 Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
6337 The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
8679 We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
9942 Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
6339 Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
18062 Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
10868 The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg]
13517 If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
10271 Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
7301 The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7302 Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7303 If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
7299 Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7300 An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
7297 My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
6338 We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
6340 There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6341 Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]