Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Epistemology', 'Abstract Objects' and 'Mathematics is Megethology'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
10807 Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
10809 We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis]
10811 The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis]
10812 The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
10813 What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis]
10814 Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10806 Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
10816 We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
10808 Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10815 We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
8915 How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10810 I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
7301 The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7302 Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7303 If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
7299 Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7300 An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
7297 My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
8917 The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
8912 Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things [Rosen]
8913 Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time [Rosen]
8914 Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
8916 Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence [Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
8918 Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation [Rosen]
8919 Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity [Rosen]